In this paper, we consider the optimal dividend problem for a company. We describe the surplus process of the company by a diffusion model with regime switching. The aim of the company is to choose a dividend policy to maximize the expected total discounted payments until ruin. In this article, we consider a hybrid dividend strategy, that is, the company is allowed to conduct continuous dividend strategy as well as impulsive dividend strategy. In addition, we consider the change of economy, which is characterized by a markovian regime-switching, and under the setting of two regimes, we solve the problem and obtain the analytical solution for the value function.
only for continuously paying dividends but also for paying block dividends from time to time.
Further we suppose the continuous dividend rate is bounded, while in Sotomayor and Cadenillas [13] the author consider the cases of both bound and unbound.
On the other hand, levy process, especially spectrally negative Levy process, is a powerful tool to characterize the dividend process, and there are many papers investigated this problem. In Loeffen et al. [12] , under the classical optimal dividend control problem, the author studied the case in which the risk process is modeled by a general spectrally negative Levy process. Loeffen [11] considered an optimal dividends problem with transaction costs, and they assumed the reserves are described by a spectrally negative Levy process too.
During the past several years, there have been a large number of literatures considered regime switching problem. In general, regime switching was used to characterize the change of economic condition. Some scholars also studied regime switching in optimal dividend problem. ( see Sotomayor and Cadenillas [13] , Wei et al. [14] , Wei et al. [15] ).
In our paper, we articulate the problem of maximizing the expected utility of an company.
Because of considering a compound dividend strategy(continuous dividend strategy as well as impulsive dividend strategy), the utility is consist of two parts which correspond to the two strategies respectively. On the other hand, we adopt Markovian regime-switching diffusion model to describe the surplus of the company, which is expected to reflect the economic circle's affection to the company's surplus.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the model and some assumptions. Further we give two properties about value function. In Section 3, we introduce quasi-variational inequalities(QVI) and give the verification theorem. Section 4 contain our main result. In this section, we work out the candidate for the value function, and then we verify that this function satisfy the conditions in the verification theorem. In section 5, we give the conclusion.
Preliminaries
In this paper, we assume the uncertainty is modeled by a probability space (Ω, F , P). At first we assume that ǫ(t) t≥0 be a homogenous finite-state continuous-time Markov chain, and for every t ≥ 0: ǫ(t) ∈ J, where J = 1, 2, ..., N and N ≥ 2. We also assume Markov chain ǫ has a strongly irreducible generator Q = [λ ij ] N ×N , where −λ i := λ ii < 0 and j∈J λ ij = 0 for every i ∈ J. Here, Markov chain represent the change of the economic situation, it can be used to describe good economy and bad economy, or to describe the business circle: recovery, prosperity, recession and depression, or any other regimes of economy. Second, we consider a company with surplus process X t t>0 and the uncertainty of the surplus process is characterized by a Brownian motion W and the markov chain defined above. We also assume that ǫ and W are independent and we denote by F = F t t≥0 the P-augmentation of the filtration {F We suppose the company would conduct dividend strategy, we model the surplus of the company X = X t , t ≥ 0 by stochastic differential equation (SDE) :
with initial value X 0 = x ≥ 0 and initial state ǫ(0) = i, where the adapted process Z = Z t , t ≥ 0 and the sum of the sequence of the random variable ξ n n∈N represent the cumulative amount of dividends paid out by the company up to time t.
Remark:
In contrast to some classical papers, our model consider a so-called hybrid dividend strategy, specifically, we assume that the company is allowed to carry out two sorts of dividend strategies:
continuous dividend strategy and impulsive dividend strategy. In terms of realistic sense, hybrid strategy provides more ways of paying out dividends. In terms of methodology, such strategy is more complicated in treating than single strategy problem.
In this paper, we assume Z t t≥0 is absolutely continuous, and let dZ t = u t dt. Further, we suppose dividend rate u t is bounded, and we denote L as its bound.
Besides we define the stopping time of bankruptcy Θ := inf t ≥ 0 : X t < 0 and impose X t = 0 for t ∈ [Θ, ∞).
Definition 2.1. A triple π := u π , Γ π , ξ π = u π (t); τ π 1 τ π 2 , ...; ξ π 1 , ξ π 2 , ...
is called an admissible control if and only if (i) u π (t) : [0, ∞) → [0, L] is an F-adapted bounded process, (ii) τ π i , i = 1, 2, ... are stopping times with respect to F, and 0 ≤ τ π 1 < τ π 2 < · · · < τ π n < · · · , a.s.
The set of all admissible controls is denoted by Π.
Suppose the utility function of the shareholder is given by g(x), which belongs to the following class G := g(x) : ∀x ≥ 0, g(0) < 0, g ′ (x) > 0 and g ′′ (x) < 0 .
Let Θ π = inf t ≥ 0 : X π t < 0 be the ruin time under the policy π. We aim at choosing a hybrid dividend policy to maximize the expected total discounted dividend payments, then given initial surplus x and initial state i, with each admissible π = u π , Γ π , ξ π , we have cost function
Note that not only the continuous dividend but also the impulsive dividend are considered in our model, the cost function above should incorporate the two corresponding utilities. Then we can define the value function
The optimal controlπ = uπ, Γπ, ξπ is a strategy under which we have the equality below:
For the need of the rest of the paper, we define µ * := max i∈J µ i and µ * := min i∈J µ i , and a technical assumption(H) is made:
that is, at each regime the bound of the dividend rate is smaller than the drift of the surplus. Now we derive some properties of the value function.
Lemma 2.2. Given g ∈ G is a utility function, then for each i ∈ J, the value function satisfy :
First, we have
Next in virtue of g(x) ≤ g ′ (0+)x, and for each π ∈ Π, let D t be the accumulated dividends process, and let dD t = 0 for t ≥ Θ π . Thus we get
where µ * = max i∈J µ i . Then we have
Lemma 2.3. Given g ∈ G is a utility function, then for each i ∈ J and 0 ≤ x 1 < x 2 , the value function satisfy :
Proof. This proof is similar to the one in Wei et al. [14] , we omit it.
Quasi-Variational Inequalities
Inspired by the work of Cadenillas et al. [5] , we introduce the quasi-variational inequalities(QVI).
First for every continuous function φ : (0, ∞) → R and given state i ∈ J, we define the maximum operator M by
MV (x, i) represents the value of the policy that consists of choosing the best immediate intervention. Obviously we have
this means x is the position where it is not optimal to choose to pay block dividend, while if
this implies x is the position where it is optimal to pay block dividend. Now let us introduce operator L, given i ∈ J, define: 
It is easy to observe that the solution of the QVI splits the interval (0, ∞) into two disjoint regions:
(i) Continuation region
It is obvious that continuation region is an open set and intervention region is a closed set. Given a solution ν to the QVI, we define the following strategy associated with this solution.
.. is called the QVI control associated with ν if for each i ∈ J the associated state process X ν given by (2.1) satisfies
7)
and for each n ≥ 2,
9)
with τ ν 0 := 0 and ξ ν 0 := 0.
is finite subset of (0, ∞), satisfies QVI (3.2)-(3.4) with ν(0, i) = 0, i ∈ J. Assume there exists
, then for every x ∈ (0, ∞)
Further, if the QVI control π ν = u ν , Γ ν , ξ ν associated with ν is admissible, then ν coincides with the value function and the QVI control associated with ν is the optimal policy , i.e.,
Proof. Let π = u π , Γ π , ξ π is an admissible control, and τ π 0 := 0, ξ π 0 := 0 then for every t ∈ [0, ∞) e −δ(t∧Θ π ∧τ π n ) ν(X (t∧Θ π ∧τ π n ) , ǫ (t∧Θ π ∧τ π n ) ) − ν(x, i)
e −δ(t∧Θ π ∧τ π i ) ν(X (t∧Θ π ∧τ π i −) , ǫ (t∧Θ π ∧τ π i ) ) − e −δ(t∧Θ π ∧τ π i−1 ) ν(X (t∧Θ π ∧τ π i−1 ) , ǫ (t∧Θ π ∧τ π i−1 ) )
Since ν(·, i) ∈ C 1 [0, ∞)) is twice continuously differentiable on (0, ∞) with a possible exception of the finite point set N , by Ito formula (see Karatzas [8] ) e −δ(t∧Θ π ∧τ π n ) ν(X (t∧Θ π ∧τ π n ) , ǫ (t∧Θ π ∧τ π n ) ) − ν(x, i)
whereN s is compensate poisson process. In virtue of QVI we have
This inequality becomes an equality for the QVI control associated with ν. Taking expectation E x,i e −δ(t∧Θ π ∧τ π n ) ν(X (t∧Θ π ∧τ π n ) , ǫ (t∧Θ π ∧τ π n ) ) − ν(x, i)
, then combining with the condition P lim n→∞ τ n ≤ T = 0 and dominated convergence theorem, we have lim n→∞ E x,i e −δ(t∧Θ π ∧τ π n ) ν(X (t∧Θ π ∧τ π n ) , ǫ (t∧Θ π ∧τ π n ) ) − ν(x, i)
and
Thus we have
where ν(X Θ π , ǫ Θ π ) = ν(0, ǫ Θ π ) = 0. Thus we have
And the inequality becomes an equality for the QVI control associated with ν.
The Solution of The QVI and The Optimal Policy
In this section we set out to solve the QVI (3.2)-(3.4), and then verify that the solution satisfies the theorem 3.3. We let g(x) = x − K, K represents the fixed cost. Note that different from Cadenillas et al. [5] and Wei et al. [14] , in which they consider the fixed cost K as well as the proportional cost k, i.e. let g(x) = kx − K. In this paper we consider the fixed cost only, in fact we will see in the following that taking the proportional cost into account is nothing but more tedious classification and calculation. Our essential method and verification can be fully illustrated by the simpler model. Now we want to find a function ν(x, i), i ∈ J as a candidate for the value function and verify the candidate satisfies the condition of theorem 3.3. For such function ν(x, i), define
We conjecture ν(x, i), i ∈ J satisfied QVI to be continuously differentiable function, and on the
In addition, we assume ν(0, i) = 0, i ∈ J. Note we will prove later these conjectures are satisfied .
Obviously the assumption of convexity of ν ′ (x, i), i ∈ J implies that the equation
has at most two roots on [0, B i ]. Indeed the proposition below tells us that E.q.(4.2) do exist only one root in the interval [0, B i ).
Moreover if the solution to QVI is unique, then for x ≥ B i :
Proof. The proof of this theorem is similar to Theorem 3.2 in Cadenillas et al. [5] , so we do not repeat it here.
From the analysis above we know under assumption in theorem 4.1, the continuation region is given by C i = [0, B i ), and when the surplus exceeds level B i , dividend will be paid such that the
that is
Note in this case ν ′ (x, i) = 1.
After making a simple analysis we can see that under the assumption above,
combining with the convexity of ν(x, i), i ∈ J, we know ν ′ (0, i) < 1 is impossible. Therefore there are two cases have to be considered :
In this case, interval [0, ∞) can be split into three sections :
(4.6) gives the following differential equations:
(4.5) gives the following differential equations:
(4.10)
In this case, interval [0, ∞) can be split into two sections :
For simplicity, we suppose in the remainder of this section that the economy changes only between two regimes, that is J = {1, 2}. Combining with the analysis above, we have three
and ν ′ (0, i) = 1 for both i ∈ J.
In the following, we need a lemma , which is cited from [13] .
According to our conjecture about
. We should note that the relationship of b i and B i , i ∈ {1, 2}, depends on the relations of the parameters in model. Here, we only consider two
that is we discuss the optimization problem among models of which parameters satisfy certain relation such that we have b
they can be treated in a similar way.
The case of
Considering the relationship between ν ′ (0, i), i ∈ {1, 2} and 1, we have three cases, ν ′ (0, i) > 1 for both i = 1, 2; ν ′ (0, i 0 ) = 1 and ν ′ (0, 3 − i 0 ) > 1 for some i 0 ∈ {1, 2}; and ν ′ (0, i) = 1 for both i = 1, 2.
Case 1: ν ′ (0, 1) > 1 and ν ′ (0, 2) > 1 .
According to the discussion above, we need to consider five possibilities:
(4.6) gives the following system of differential equations:
where for each j = 1, 2, 3, 4,Ḃ
, we have ν ′ (x, 1) ≤ 1 and ν ′ (x, 2) > 1, E.q.(4.6),(4.5) give the following system of differential equations:
(λi+δ)(λ2+δ)−λ1λ2 , i = 1, 2 and for j = 1, 2, 3, 4,
(4.5) gives the following system of differential equations:
and for j = 1, 2, 3, 4,B
, we have ν ′ (x, 1) = 1 and ν ′ (x, 2) < 1. E.q.(4.5),(4.7) give the following system of differential equations: 
It has two real roots:α 1 <α 2 , then the solution of the ODE is:
Then the E.q.(4.22) has solution: In order to find the thresholds b 1 , b 2 , B 1 , B 2 , and the coefficientsȦ 1 ,
We suppose the smooth fit condition hold, and combined with ν ′ (b i , i) = 1 for i = 1, 2, we have the equations following: Note that we assume ν ′ (0, 1) > 1 and ν ′ (0, 2) > 1. This condition is satisfied if and only if the coefficients found through the system of E.q.(4.14) satisfy:
(4.26)
Without loss of generality we assume i 0 = 1, we have ν ′ (0, 1) = 1, ν ′ (0, 2) > 1. The case of i 0 = 2 has the similar treatment. Under this assumption,we have b 1 = 0 and we need to consider four possibilities:
.
, ν ′ (x, 1) ≤ 1 and ν ′ (x, 2) > 1, we have the following system of differential equations:
Consider the characteristic equation for (4.27), φ 2 1 (θ)φ 2 2 (θ) = λ 1 λ 2 , where φ 2 1 and φ 2 2 have been defined in case 1, and by the similar way we know the solution of the E.q.
29)
where θ 1 < θ 2 < 0 < θ 3 < θ 4 are characteristic roots.
When x ∈ [b 2 , B 1 ), ν ′ (x, 1) < 1 and ν ′ (x, 2) ≤ 1, we have the following system of differential equations:
Considering the characteristic equation for (4.30), φ 3 1 ( θ)φ 3 2 ( θ) = λ 1 λ 2 , where φ 3 1 and φ 3 2 have been defined in the previous section, and by the similar way we know the solution of the E.q.
and for j = 1, 2, 3, 4,
, ν ′ (x, 1) = 1 and ν ′ (x, 2) ≤ 1, we have the following system of differential equations: 
where U (x) has been defined in the previous section, that is
where ν(b 2 , 2) can be calculated by E.q.(4.31).
In order to find the thresholds b 2 , B 1 , B 2 , and the coefficients C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 , C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ,
We suppose the smooth fit condition hold, and combined with ν ′ (b 2 , i) = 1 for i = 1, 2, we have the equations following: Take notice that we assume ν ′ (0, 1) = 1 and ν ′ (0, 2) > 1. This condition is satisfied if and only if the coefficients found through the system of E.q.(4.28) satisfy:
(4.36)
Case 3: ν ′ (0, 1) = 1, ν ′ (0, 2) = 1.
There are three intervals need to be considered :
When x ∈ [0, B 1 ), ν ′ (x, 1) ≤ 1 and ν ′ (x, 2) ≤ 1 then we have the following system of differential
37)
Consider the characteristic equation for (4.37), φ 3 1 (β)φ 3 2 (β) = λ 1 λ 2 , where φ 3 1 and φ 3 2 have been defined in case 1, and by the similar way we know the solution of the E.q. and for j = 1, 2, 3, 4,
, ν ′ (x, 1) = 1 and ν ′ (x, 2) ≤ 1 then we have the following system of differential equations:
Consider the characteristic equation for the second equation above, φ 4 ( β) = 1 2 σ 2 2 β 2 + (µ 2 − L) β − (λ 2 + δ) = 0. It has two real roots: β 1 < β 2 , then the solution of the ODE is:
where U (x) has been defined in the previous section.
(4.41)
In order to find the thresholds B 1 , B 2 , and the coefficients M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , M 4 , N 1 , N 2 . We suppose the smooth fit condition hold, thus we have the equations following:
Meanwhile the coefficients N 1 , N 2 , N 3 , N 4 can be obtained from equation (4.39).
Note that we assume ν ′ (0, 1) = 1 and ν ′ (0, 2) = 1. This condition is satisfied if the coefficients found through the system of E.q.(4.38) satisfy:
(4.43)
Next we will give a theorem which shows that ν is indeed the value function. We also give the optimal dividend policy.
Assume thatȦ j , A j ,Â j , j = 1, 2, 3, 4,Ȃ j , j = 1, 2 be the solution of the system E.q.(4.25) and suppose they satisfy condition (4.26). In addition,Ḃ j , B j ,B j , j = 1, 2, 3, 4,B j , j = 1, 2 and U (x) are defined before. Then the function ν given by
are the value function. And optimal strategyπ = û,Γ,ξ = π ν = u ν , Γ ν , ξ ν is the QVI control associated with ν, furthermore,û is defined bŷ
Consider the case in whichȦ j , A j ,Â j , j = 1, 2, 3, 4,Ȃ j , j = 1, 2 do not satisfy condition 
for t ∈ [0,Θ), andû(t) = 0 for t ∈ [Θ, ∞).
Consider the case in which condition (4.26) and (4.36) are not satisfied, but condition (4.43)
is satisfied. We suppose M j ,j = 1, 2, 3, 4; N j , j = 1, 2 be the solution of the system E.q.(4.42), and N j , j = 1, 2, 3, 4, U (x) are defined before. Then the function ν given by
are the value function. And optimal strategyπ = û,Γ,ξ = π ν = u ν , Γ ν , ξ ν is the QVI control associated with ν, furthermore,û defined bŷ
Proof. We omit the proof, because it is similar to and simpler than the proof of Theorem 4.5
below.
The case of
In this subsection we assume b 1 < B 1 < b 2 < B 2 . Considering the relationship between ν ′ (0, i), i ∈ {1, 2} and 1, we have three cases: ν ′ (0, i) > 1 for both i ∈ {1, 2}; ν ′ (0, i 0 ) = 1 and ν ′ (0, 3 − i 0 ) > 1 for some i 0 ∈ {1, 2}; and ν ′ (0, i) = 1 for both i ∈ {1, 2}.
Case 1: ν ′ (0, 1) > 1 and ν ′ (0, 2) > 1
When x ∈ [0, b 1 ), we have ν ′ (x, 1) > 1 and ν ′ (x, 2) > 1, E.q.(4.6) gives the following system of differential equations:
which is the same as E.q.(4.13). By the same way as in previous section, we have the solution:
, we have ν ′ (x, 1) ≤ 1 and ν ′ (x, 2) > 1, E.q.(4.5),(4.6) give the following system of differential equations: 
A j , (4.49) and α 1 < α 2 < 0 < α 3 < α 4 are the four roots of characteristic equation
Next we give a theorem which is similar to the one in [13] . To apply it in our situation, we need to adapt it in some details, and then we complete its proof. Proof. If ν ′′ (·, 1) is strictly increasing in certain left neighborhood of B 1 , then exist constant c, for every x ∈ [B 1 − c, B 1 ) , we have ν ′′′ (x, 1) > 0, in particular ν ′′′ (B 1 −, 1) > 0. Hence, combined with the definition of φ 2 1 :
Here we use the assumption (H) µ * > L.
, ν ′ (x, 1) = 1 and ν ′ (x, 2) > 1, then we have the following system of differential equations: 
, ν ′ (x, 1) = 1 and ν ′ (x, 2) < 1, then we have the following system of differential equations: where ν(b 1 , 1) can be calculated by E.q.(4.48). According to section 4.1, we know the solution of . In order to find the thresholds b 1 , b 2 , B 1 , B 2 , and the coefficientsȦ 1 ,Ȧ 2 ,Ȧ 3 ,Ȧ 4 , A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 ,
We suppose the smooth fit condition hold, and combined with ν ′ (b i , i) = 1 for i = 1, 2, we have the equations following:
ν(0, 1) = 0, ν(0, 2) = 0, ν(b 1 +, 1) = ν(b 1 −, 1), ν(b 1 +, 2) = ν(b 1 −, 2), Note that we assume ν ′ (0, 1) > 1 and ν ′ (0, 2) > 1. This condition is satisfied if the coefficients found through the system of E.q.(4.45) satisfy:
(4.56)
Case 2: ν ′ (0, 1) = 1 and ν ′ (0, 2) > 1
According to the discussion above, we need to consider four possibilities:
When x ∈ [0, B 1 ), we have ν ′ (x, 1) ≤ 1 and ν ′ (x, 2) > 1, E.q.(4.5),(4.6) give the following system of differential equations:
(4.57)
By the similar way, we know the solution of E.q.(4.57) is When x ∈ [B 1 , b 2 ), ν ′ (x, 1) = 1 and ν ′ (x, 2) > 1, then we have the following system of differential equations:
(4.60)
Consider the characteristic equation for the second equation above: φ 5 ( θ) = 1 2 σ 2 2 θ 2 +µ 2 θ−(λ 2 +δ) = 0. It has two real roots: θ 1 < θ 2 , then the solution of the ODE is:
ν(x, 2) = D 1 e θ1(x−b2) + D 2 e θ2(x−b2) +Ū (x). When x ∈ [b 2 , B 2 ), we have ν ′ (x, 1) = 1 and ν ′ (x, 2) ≤ 1. E.q.(4.5),(4.7) give the following system of differential equations: In order to find the thresholds b 2 , B 1 , B 2 , and the coefficients
We suppose the smooth fit condition hold and ν ′ (b i , i) = 1 for i = 1, 2, thus we have the equations following:
Note that we assume ν ′ (0, 1) = 1 and ν ′ (0, 2) > 1. This condition is satisfied if the coefficients found through the system of E.q.(4.61) satisfy:
(4.66)
Assume thatȦ j , A j , j = 1, 2, 3, 4,B j ,B j , j = 1, 2 be the solution of the system E.q.(4.55) and suppose they satisfy condition (4.56). Assume thatḂ j , B j , j = 1, 2, 3, 4 and U (x),Ū (x)are defined before. Then the function ν given by
is the value function. And optimal strategyπ = û,Γ,ξ = π ν = u ν , Γ ν , ξ ν is the QVI control associated with ν, furthermore,û defined bŷ
Consider the case in whichȦ j , A j , j = 1, 2, 3, 4,Â j ,Ȃ j , j = 1, 2 do not satisfy condition (4.56). Instead suppose condition (4.66) are satisfied, and assume C j , j = 1, 2, 3, 4 andD j , D j , j = 1, 2 be the solution of the system E.q.(4.65). D j , j = 1, 2, 3, 4 and F j , j = 1, 2, U (x),Ū (x) are defined before. Then the function ν given by
Proof. To prove the function ν defined above is value function, we have only to show it satisfies the conditions of theorem 3.3. Obviously, we have ν(x, 1)
. From smooth fit condition, we can see ν(0, i) = 0, i ∈ {1, 2}, and ν(0, i), i ∈ {1, 2} is continuously differentiable function. On the other hand, it is manifest that
In the following, if we can prove ν(x, i), i ∈ {1, 2} satisfy QVI, then we would complete the proof.
Firstly, we consider the case in which coefficientsȦ j , A j , j = 1, 2, 3, 4,Ȃ j ,Â j , j = 1, 2 are the solution of the system E.q.(4.55) and they satisfy condition (4.56), that is, the case of ν ′ (0, i) > 1, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Taking account of ν ′ (x, 1), on the interval [0, b 1 ), ν ′ (x, 1) > 1, then we have
Then we have equation
Further, we can prove, on the interval [0, b 1 ), inequality ν(x, 1) > Mν(x, 1) holds. Indeed by differentiating ν(x − η) + η − K with respect to η, we can see function ν(x − η) + η − K is decrease with respect to η. Thus on the interval [0, b 1 )
So QVI is satisfied for ν(x, 1) on interval [0, b 1 ).
Secondly, on the interval [b 1 , B 1 ), ν ′ (x, 1) ≤ 1, then we have
On the other hand, we have
, function ν(x − η) + η − K is increase with respect to η and at the point
Thirdly, we consider the case x ∈ [B 1 , b 2 ). To begin with, we need to note ν ′ (x, 2) is decrease
From definition of b 2 and smooth fit condition, we get ν ′ (x, 2) > ν ′ (b 2 , 2) = 1, then we havê
which imply ν ′ (x, 2) is strictly convex function. Combing with the truth ν ′ (x, 2) > ν ′ (b 2 , 2). we know ν ′ (x, 2) strictly decrease on the interval [B 1 , b 2 ).
Next we need to note ν ′′ (x, 1) is strictly increasing in certain left neighborhood of point B 1 .
Indeed, by smooth fit condition and continuity, function ν ′ (B 1 −, 1) > 0, therefore on this neighborhood we have
then we obtain
As a result we know ν ′′ (x, 1) is strictly increasing on this neighborhood. Now we begin to prove that, on the interval [B 1 , b 2 ), the function ν(x, 1) satisfies QVI. For
x ∈ [B 1 , b 2 ) and for every u ∈ [0, L], We know A(x) is decreased, then we have A(x) ≤ A(B 1 ) ≤ 0
On the other hand, we can prove for x ∈ [B 1 , b 2 ), ν(x, 1) = Mν(x, 1). Indeed for x ∈ [B 1 , b 2 ),
so we get ν(x, 1) = Mν(x, 1). Combining with the obvious truth ν(x, 1) ≥ Mν(x, 1), we have completed the proof that ν(x, 1) satisfies QVI on the [B 1 , b 2 ).
In the end we verify that on [b 2 , ∞), ν(x, 1) satisfies QVI. With the same argument, we know for x ∈ [b 2 , ∞), ν(x, 1) = Mν(x, 1). Besides, we have max u∈[0,L] L 1 (u)ν(x, 1) + u ≤ 0.
Indeed, since ν ′′ (b 2 , 1) = 0 and the result satisfied by ν(x, 1) on the interval x ∈ [B 1 , b 2 ). We have
So for x > b 2 , note ν ′′ (x, 1) = 0, then we have 
where ξ ∈ [b 2 , x), which lead to ν ′ (ξ, 2) ≤ 1. Then we have max u∈[0,L] L 1 (u)ν(x, 1) + u ≤ 0.
In the following, we need to verify function ν(x, 2) satisfies QVI, which is similar to the way of proving the case of ν(x, 1). We demonstrate briefly:
At first, on the interval [0, b 2 ), ν ′ (x, 2) > 1, we have 
Then we have max u∈[0,L] L 2 (u)ν(x, 2) + u ≤ 0.
Combining with ν(x, 2) = Mν(x, 2), we know QVI is satisfied.
As far as the case in which ν ′ (0, 1) = 1 and ν ′ (0, 2) > 1, the verfication is similar, we omit it.
Conclusion
In this paper, we stand the point of a manager to consider the optimal dividend problem. We assume the surplus of the company is affected by macroeconomic conditions. The manager have to make decision based on economic change which is described by a continuous-time Markov chain.
The main contribution of this paper is that we break through the limitation of single dividend strategy to consider the mixed classical-impulse dividend strategy, and the value function as well as the optimal dividend strategy are explicitly derived.
